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ABSTRACT: Aliseda’s Abductive Reasoning is focused on the logical problem of abduction. My paper, in contrast, deals 
with the epistemic problems raised by this sort of inference. I analyze the relation between abduction and 
inference to the best explanation (IBE). Firstly a heuristic and a normative interpretation of IBE are distin-
guished. The epistemic problem is particularly pressing for the latter interpretation, since it is devoid of 
content without specific epistemic criteria for separating acceptable explanations from those which are not. 
Then I discuss two different normative interpretations of IBE. I. Niiniliuoto favours a “probabilistic-
confirmational” translation of explanatory merit while S. Psillos thinks that the insight of IBE is lost in a 
pure probabilistic format. My conclusion is that Aliseda’s theory of abduction fits better with a heuristic ac-
count of IBE. 
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1. Aliseda’s approach to abduction 
According to Aliseda 2006 (p. 46) the logical form of abduction can be represented as 
follows:  
Θ, α → ϕ            (1) 
where Θ and α refer, respectively, to the background knowledge and to the explana-
tion obtained; ‘→’ designates the explanatory inferential link, and ϕ alludes to a par-
ticular bit of evidence, preferably some novel or anomalous fact.  
In contrast to deduction, abduction is a sort of non-monotonic —ampliative— in-
ference. It is necessary, then, to specify the background knowledge involved, Θ, since, 
even though it did not contain any falsity, further additions could turn an acceptable 
inference into an unacceptable one. On the other side, since Aliseda’s research adopts 
a very general standpoint on abductive reasoning, she avoids any commitment to a 
particular theory of explanation. The symbol ‘→’ could be understood, then, as syn-
tactic derivability, semantic entailment, probabilistic dependence, …, but neither of 
these interpretations is forced upon us. Aliseda claims that the logical challenge raised 
by abduction is to determine the formal conditions for generating all those αs that 
satisfy (1).  
Nevertheless, there are better and worse explanations. In principle, we are inter-
ested in those that are more accurate. But there may be several explanations that fulfil 
the formal schema (1). They may also be incompatible. So, which one believe? Should 
we suspend judgment over all them? Are there further factors that could be relevant? 
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For this reason a complete analysis of abduction must include both the generation of 
abductions, where the logical challenge arises, and the selection over them.  
Aliseda takes notice of this double dimension of abduction (ibid., p. 33). She even 
suggests the possibility of including an additional parameter in (1) to rank the explana-
tions obtained according to their quality. In a section entitled “Selecting the Best Ex-
planation” (ibid., pp. 72-74) she points out that simplicity and some other factors as 
likelihood or predictive power should be taken into account. However, she argues that 
“What makes a hypothesis good or best has no easy answer … As we have not been 
able to shed a new light from logic upon these matters, we will ignore these dimen-
sions here” (p. 73). Consequently, Aliseda’s approach focuses on the logical problem of 
abduction, that is, on “the characterization of abductive explanations as products [...] 
and with the processes for constructing these.” (ibid., p. 46).  
In this paper, in contrast, our main concern will be how we could justify the pref-
erence criteria for selection among rival explanations. It’s worth emphasizing that this 
is an epistemological problem, since the relevant criteria intend to distinguish the true 
explanations —or the most probable explanations— from the false ones.  
2. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) 
Peirce used the term ‘abduction’ to refer both to generation and selection of hypothe-
ses. Certainly, the distinction is not clear-cut. Perceptual judgments in ordinary condi-
tions were understood by Peirce as “extreme cases of abductive inferences” where the 
abductive suggestion “comes to us as a flash” (CP, 5.181), with no consideration of 
any other alternatives. Concerning such episodes the distinction between generation 
and selection seems rather artificial. However, finding suitable explanations in scien-
tific contexts use to be more complicated so it makes sense to distinguish between 
generation and selection. Firstly, there is an explicit search for alternative potential 
explanations which fit with the evidence. Then a subsequent comparison among them 
is made concerning the degree they satisfy some explanatory desiderata.2  
Admittedly, generation is not inconsistent with an unconscious selection process. 
Scientists do not intend to compare all the logical possibilities. In fact, they normally 
take seriously only a few of them. This makes easier the subsequent comparison from 
the batch of alternatives. Since the demands of experimental testing concerning the 
amount of time, money, number of people involved, may be considerable, the result-
ing ranking gives a useful advice about how to proceed at this stage. More than thirty 
years ago Gilbert Harman coined the expression ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE) to 
refer to this sort of non-deductive inference (Harman, 1965). It’s worth emphasizing, 
then, that the goal of this process is to select that hypothesis that is the best from an 
explanatory point of view. 
 Having said this, it should be added that IBE may be understood in two different 
ways: either as a heuristic procedure or as an epistemic rule. According to the former, IBE 
equates to a search strategy for abductive solutions, that is, for potential explanations 
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(Hanson, 1961). Selective search guided by explanatory considerations is preferred to 
blind search as a way of discovering the possibilities that would explain ϕ and fit with 
Θ in (1). In contrast, the epistemological interpretation of IBE intended by Harman 
does not only affirm that, when comparing and choosing among rival hypotheses, 
scientific reasoning is guided by explanatory criteria. It also defends the claim that this 
policy is truth-conducive: true or highly probable explanations are favoured while 
false, or low-probability ones, are discarded. The epistemological interpretation of IBE 
can be put schematically thus:  
e is a collection of data, facts, observations, … 
h explains e (if h were true, e would be a matter of course)
no other hypothesis explains e as well as h does 
Therefore, h is true. 
 The dotted line represents a non-deductive connection between premises and con-
clusion. The normative principle is clear: among the array of hypotheses that account 
for the evidence we should accept as true the best of them qua explanation.3 Simplicity, 
explanatory scope, fertility, precision, and compatibility with the background theories, 
are some of the properties usually invoked to this effect. Anyway, the crucial factor 
for acceptance is the explanatory goodness afforded by the hypotheses at issue.  
3. A reliabilist justification for IBE?  
As we remarked earlier, sometimes abductive inference does not leave room for any 
doubt except in a purely academic sense. A reliabilist justification for abduction per-
haps could be grounded on these episodes. A few remarks will suffice to show how 
the reliabilist argument proceeds.  
Not all of my perceptual judgements are true, but a great number of them are in-
deed true. Leaving aside exceptional circumstances, human perception is a reliable 
process insofar as the rate of true beliefs obtained through it is fairly high. Even 
though it can be false, any particular perceptual belief of mine is then automatically 
justified, according to a reliabilist standpoint, since it belongs to a class of beliefs that 
are mostly true (Goldman 1979). Now, think of those perceptual beliefs where the 
conclusion comes to us as a flash or, if you prefer less controversial examples, think 
about all those trivial facts whose explanation is obvious. The argument for IBE is 
analogous. Given that among the beliefs-explanations arrived at through IBE in eve-
ryday reasoning the rate of true beliefs is considerably high, IBE is a reliable process. 
Consequently, its output —belief in h or acceptance of h as true, when h is the best 
explanation— is justified.  
Granted that ordinary perceptual beliefs are extreme cases of IBE, a reliabilist ap-
proach could work. In general, there are no special difficulties to assess the truth-value 
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of everyday perceptual judgements. And the same is for the “obvious explanations”. 
In both cases we have a wide basis of episodes to get a rough estimate. But things are 
different when dealing with theoretical scientific hypotheses because theoretical truth 
is much more elusive. Theoretical entities, mechanisms, processes, …, are devised to 
explain the empirical domain. Unfortunately, history of science is paved with dis-
carded, and presumably false, theories. On account of this, straight extrapolation of 
truth-rate in everyday contexts to theoretical ones is, on my opinion, unacceptable. On 
the other side, the IBE-schema infers an absolute conclusion from a comparative 
premise. It is affirmed that the best explanation is true only because it is better than its 
rivals. But, wouldn’t it be more appropriate to conclude that the best explanation is 
just closer to the truth —or that it has more verisimilitude— than the remaining alter-
natives? (see Kuipers 2004 and Niiniluoto 2005).  
The normative principle ‘accept the best explanation’ puts the epistemological 
question —are explanatory criteria truth-conducive?— at the forefront. Advocates of 
the epistemic interpretation of IBE are bound to provide a rationale for their confi-
dence on IBE’s normative import. And the foregoing comments about reliabilism 
suggest, in fact, that a sophisticated detour seems unavoidable to justify IBE’s, at least 
in respect of the scientific context.  
4. Explanatory value, probability and acceptance 
Niiniluoto has explored the link between explanatory goodness and degree of confirma-
tion. From this point of view we are forced to translate the former notion into prob-
abilistic terms. Niiniluoto thinks that Hempelian “systematic power” (syst) is a suitable 
translation: syst(h, e) = p(~h/~e). If syst is used as a truth-dependent epistemic utility 
(Niiniluoto 1999, 187), maximization of syst recommends the acceptance of the hy-
pothesis with the highest value for a well-known measure of degree of incremental con-
firmation: conf(h, e) = p(h/e) – p(h) (Niiniluoto 2004, 71). Therefore, if the set of rival 
hypotheses is a partition, that is, if h1, h2, ..., hn, are mutually exclusive and jointly ex-
haustive, and granted that h1 is the best explanation in the partition, then:  
(i)  conf(h1, e) > conf(hi ≠ 1, e) 
that is, the best explanation is also the hypothesis that enjoys the highest degree of 
confirmation. Niiniluoto concludes that the Bayesian framework is appropriate to 
solve the “selection problem” of abduction: “These results establish a probabilistic link 
between explanatory power and truth: posterior probability p(h/e) is the rational degree of 
belief in the truth of h on the basis of e, and thereby confirmation (as increase of 
probability by new evidence) means that we rationally become more certain of the 
truth of h than before” (Niiniluoto 2004, 76).  
A straightforward result of Niiniluoto’s approach is that IBE can only give us a 
comparative conclusion, i.e., that the best explanation is more confirmed than its 
competitors. However, at this point it is worth noticing that IBE affirms that explana-
tory considerations may be so overwhelming that the best explanation must be accepted. 
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And that means that we must believe that it is true.4 However, no partisan of IBE 
would endorse the application of the rule ‘accept the best explanation’ with no further 
qualifications. For instance, if the best explanation were not, after all, good enough, 
the most reasonable option would be to suspend judgment and wait for new evidence. 
As P. Lipton has put it: “Inference to the Best Explanation might be more accurately 
if less memorably called ‘Inference to the Best Explanation if the Best is Sufficiently 
Good’” (Lipton 2004, 154; see also chap. 4). Then, even though Niiniluto’s proposal 
guarantees that the more (less) explanatory merit, the higher (lower) value for conf, 
acceptance requires an absolute threshold for p(h/e).  
Demanding that p(h/e) is more probable than its negation —p(h/e) > p(~h/e)—, is, 
on my view, an appropriate constraint here. If the set of rival hypotheses is a partition, 
granted that h1 is the best explanation, then p(h1/e) > p(h2 ∨ h3 ∨ ... ∨ hn/e). The ration-
ale for this is that although p(h1/e) may be higher than each of the remaining condi-
tional probabilities —p(h2/e),…, p(hn/e)—, if p(h1/e) is low, we should not accept h1. In 
sum, acceptance of h1 demands a further necessary condition:  
(ii)  p(h1/e) > ½  
Then, provided that syst encapsulates the intuitive notion of explanatory goodness, (i) 
and (ii) establish, on my view, a probabilistic link between explanatory value and accep-
tance. Acceptance, on its turn, has full epistemic import, since it depends on probability 
and degree of confirmation, and not on pragmatic or instrumental considerations.  
Nonetheless, it is controversial that (i) and (ii) offer an adequate interpretation of 
the normative principle embodied in IBE —‘accept the best explanation!’. Some ad-
vocates of IBE object that “something would have gone amiss if we thought that the 
best explanation was not reasonably acceptable before it was subjected to Bayesian 
confirmation” (Psillos 2004, 89-90). According to Psillos, an essential aspect of IBE is 
that explanatory merit determines the probability of the hypothesis. Then, if accepting 
the best explanation entirely depends on confirmational support, IBE loses much of 
its excitement because “what is particularly challenging with IBE is the suggestion that 
the fact that a hypothesis is the best explanation (…) ipso facto warrants the judgement 
that it is likely” (Psillos 2002, 617). Consequently, it cannot occur that a good explana-
tion is both unlikely and unacceptable.  
Apparently, Psillos’s objection misses the point. The possibility raised by him is 
ruled out by conditions (i) and (ii). Thus, according to the foregoing discussion higher 
initial plausibility —that is, higher prior probability— and higher explanatory likeli-
hood together are sufficient for higher conf (Niiniluoto 2004, 71). Given that explanatory 
merit has to do both with prior probabilities and with likelihoods,5 a good explanation 
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should enjoy a high value for conf. Besides, the best explanation is not only more prob-
able than its rivals but probable enough to deserve acceptance, as (ii) states. Thus, 
correspondence between qualitative intuitive criteria of explanatory goodness and 
quantitative probability is guaranteed.  
But Psillos’s misgivings against a probabilistic account of IBE run deeper. He 
stresses that explanatory considerations determine which hypothesis is rational to be-
lieve with no concern about its confirmational consequences: “if a hypothesis has been chosen 
as the best explanation, then it has fared best in an explanatory-quality test with its 
competing rivals. So unless there is reason to think that it is superseded by an even 
better explanation, or unless there is reason to believe that the recalcitrant evidence 
points to one of the rivals as a better explanation, to stick with the best explanatory 
hypothesis is entirely reasonable.” (Psillos 2002, 622). To illustrate his position Psillos 
discusses the base-rate fallacy. Let us suppose that: (i) h1 is the best explanation; 
(ii) p(e/h1) is high; (iii) p(h1/e) is low —because p(h1) is still lower. Psillos asserts that it 
is not difficult to find examples where those three conditions are fulfilled and we 
should accept h1, that is, a hypothesis that is very unlikely given e (see Psillos 2004, 85-
87).  
It could be pointed out that perhaps what we take to be the best explanation is not 
really the best. Psillos replies that “if the search for other potential explanations has 
been thorough, and if the present information does not justify a further exploration of 
the logical space of potentially explanatory hypotheses, there is no specific reason to 
doubt that the current best explanation is simply the best explanation” (Psillos 2002, 
622). From this point of view, the acceptance of the best explanation mainly depends 
on the characteristics of the process whereby it has been selected, and not on its de-
gree of confirmation. But, according to Psillos, the acceptance of the best explanation 
is prima facie reasonable, since it enhances the explanatory coherence of our total belief 
corpus.  
This seems a radical departure from Niiniluoto’s standpoint. For him, IBE is epis-
temically sound because it provides us with the most confirmed hypothesis. For Psil-
los, in contrast, favouring the best explanation equates to favouring the hypothesis 
that fits better with our background beliefs. Not surprisingly, Psillos asserts that good 
explanations give us explanatory coherence. But the epistemological challenge still 
remains, albeit in a reformulated way: why should we think that those explanations 
that afford explanatory coherence are true, or highly likely? We may agree with Psillos 
that the best explanation is the most plausible explanatory alternative. The epistemo-
logical question here is whether the plausible and the probable (or the true) go in the 
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same direction. I think that talking about prima facie justification is not very helpful 
here.  
Let us take stock. In section 2 I pointed at two main interpretations of IBE: the 
heuristic —IBE as an alternative to facilitate search for explanations— and the 
normative —IBE as a truth-conducive rule. Two different accounts of the normative 
interpretation were discussed in section 4 —Niiniluoto’s and Psillos’s. They agree that 
favouring the best explanation is the best epistemic move. Niiniluoto tries to forge an 
analytic link between explanatory value and truth by means of confirmation. I sug-
gested a way of closing the gap between confirmation and acceptance by adding a 
condition that alludes to an absolute threshold. Psillos, in contrast, insists that this 
interpretation sacrifices the most genuine claim of IBE.  
I will not try to solve this disagreement, but some remarks are in order here. The 
normative interpretation of IBE is inspired by standard situations where “the abduc-
tive suggestion comes to us as a flash”, in Peirce’s words. Admittedly, these situations 
are very common in daily life. They even give some chances to a reliabilist justification 
of abduction, as we argued in section 2. But the situation may be completely different 
when we move to the “theory-choice” scenery. Empirical research on probabilistic 
reasoning has shown that we repeatedly violate the axioms of probability theory: the 
most plausible conclusion for the agent —the one which she infers— is not the most 
probable given the available information to her (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). 
It may be true that the most plausible conclusion is that one that stands out for its 
explanatory merits. But this leaves open the possibility that intuitions underlying eve-
ryday criteria of explanatory goodness collide with standard scientific comparison of 
rival hypotheses.  
The rationality of human cognition is a big issue beyond the purview of this paper. 
Here it suffices for us to acknowledge that scientific inference is not just an extended 
application of common sense criteria. I do not claim that this is something new. Psil-
los tries to link explanatory merit to acceptance without intermediaries. My point is 
that the limits of his approach are, after all, the remarkable limits of everyday explana-
tory reasoning when applied to the scientific context.  
5. Epilogue: consequences of Aliseda’s theory of abduction on IBE 
Aliseda distinguishes between the logical and the epistemological questions raised by 
abduction —generation and selection, respectively. Although she focuses on the first 
one, the “selection problem” is the central question in the contemporary debate on 
IBE. Following Peirce, Aliseda insists that economy and empirical testability are im-
portant constraints on abductive explanations. Acceptance of an explanatory hypothe-
sis depends on the results of subsequent empirical tests. The abductive explanation is, 
thus, a suggestion more or less convincing “that has to be put to test before convert-
ing itself into a belief”.6 These views on the epistemological problem of abduction are 
hardly compatible to Psillos’s standpoint on IBE. But they neither fit well with Ni-
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iniluoto’s account. After all, Niiniluoto’s vindication of IBE is supported by an ana-
lytic relation between explanatory goodness and confirmation. On account of this I 
conclude that Aliseda’s theory of abduction should favour a purely heuristic reading of 
IBE.  
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